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Tomoki Kamo
Since the beginning of the 1990s, local people’s congresses (LPC) have become 
increasingly active as local legislative institutions in China. Recent discussions show that LPCs 
have changed from serving as rubber stamps to being iron stamps. Based on an analysis of bills 
submitted to the Yangzhou Municipal People’s Congresses, we find that congress delegates have 
increasingly represented the interests and demands of the geographic areas from which they 
have been elected, and that local people’s congresses have become places where people can 
present and coordinate various competing interests. However, another entity for political 
participation in China’s authoritarian regime, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), has been understudied. This paper also analyzes the proposals submitted 
to the Yangzhou Municipal Committee of the CPPCC. It finds that the CPPCC has collaborated 
with delegates of the Yangzhou Municipal People’s Congress (MPC). It particularly focuses on 
a case where an economic development plan that the Yangzhou Municipal Party Committee 
drafted was revised. It finds that delegates of the Yangzhou MPC represented the interests of 
their constituencies, which are based on geographically determined electoral areas, while 
members of the CPPCC represented interest groups that were formed on the basis of local 
business communities. It argues that LPCs and the local committees of the CPPCC have become 
venues for people to present and coordinate various competing interests within the local 
community.
The Political Roles of China’s Democratic 
Institutions: Agents, Remonstrators and 
Representatives, and Collaboration between 
Democratic Institutions 
Abstract
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Norihiko Yamada
Over the past ten years, the study of authoritarian regimes has shown considerable interest 
in how nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures, political parties, and elections, 
play an important role in the survival of these regimes. Democratic institutions under such 
regimes are not mere window-dressing, but they can be important tools for regime survival. 
However, previous studies are based on “multi-party” and “competitive elections,” but one party 
dictatorships, such as exist in China, Vietnam, and Laos, have not attracted much attention or 
been the subject of much empirical analysis. This article, by choosing Laos as an example, 
argues that even though there are no explicit or potential threats to the regime, the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) uses the legislature and elections as tools to ensure the regime's 
survival. Whereas the LPRP already maintains a solid system of rule in Lao society, it has 
established a mechanism for soaking up public opinion in the National Assembly since the mid-
2000s in a way that  corresponds to an expanding variety of socio-economic problems. The 
LPRP also uses elections to bolster this mechanism by changing the attributes of candidates in 
order to address changing public needs. This argument is supported by empirical analysis of the 
past five elections. The LPRP links the National Assembly with elections as a tool to garner 
public support for the regime. Even though the functions of the legislature and of the elections 
are different from those of other authoritarian regimes, the article shows that even nominal 
institutions in a one party dictatorship can play an important role in a regime’s survival. 
Survival of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
Regime: Co-optation of the People through the 
National Assembly and Elections
Abstract
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Ayako Masuhara
This paper focuses on the relationship between the Indonesian government and Islamic 
groups from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s during the authoritarian Suharto regime. I 
analyze the process of deliberation on the 1974 Marriage Bill at the People’s Representative 
Council (DPR), the resolutions regarding P 4 and Aliran kepercayaan at the general session of 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1978, and the 1985 Mass Organization Bill at the 
DPR, and I discuss how the relationship between the government and Islamic groups changed 
from mutual antagonism to harmony. One of the reasons for this change is the role of 
musyawarah-mufakat (consultation and consensus) within and outside the DPR. In the process 
of deliberation on the 1974 Marriage Bill, the Islamic party (PPP) and Islamic groups excluded 
the government party, Golkar, from musyawarah (consultation). In the process of deliberation 
on resolutions regarding P 4 and Aliran kepercayaan in 1978, the PPP and Islamic groups were 
excluded from musyawarah. However, in the process of deliberation on the 1985 Mass 
Organization Bill, musyawarah-mufakat played an important role in building a consensus 
between the government and Islamic groups concerning the problem of the five pillars of the 
state's philosophy, the Pancasila, being the only principle for all mass organizations in 
Indonesia. After the bill was passed, almost all Islamic organizations accepted Pancasila as the 
only principle for their organizations because they were allowed to maintain their Islamic 
identity in their platforms under the law. After this, relations between the government and 
Islamic groups became harmonious.
The Parliament and Consensus Building under the 
Suharto Regime in Indonesia
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Shin Toyoda
Scholars seem to have reached a consensus that dictators use authoritarian elections and 
challenges from both insiders within the regime and outsiders who are opposed to the 
dictatorship. More specifically, previous studies list four beneficial functions that political 
institutions may play: (1) authoritarian elections can be an information gathering device, (2) 
authoritarian elections can serve to trap outside opposition, (3) authoritarian elections can 
transmit a public signal of the dictator's’ strength to elites within the regime, and (4) an 
authoritarian political party can act as a power-sharing device between a dictator and a nation's 
elites. The aim of this paper is to argue that authoritarian political institutions cannot fulfill these 
functions simultaneously, since the first two functions hinder proper working of the third and 
fourth, and vice versa. Although dictators who want to obtain information and divide the outside 
opposition need to make elections competitive to some extent, having competitive elections 
makes it difficult for a dictator either to send a public signal of a regime's strength or to 
discipline regime insiders. To demonstrate that these four functions are indeed contradictory, 
this paper analyzes the process of institutional change in Mexico from 1960 to 1980, when the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party was the hegemonic authoritarian party. Historical analysis 
based on newly available archive sources clearly shows that successive dictators in Mexico 
recognized that there exists a dilemma; increased electoral competitiveness enables the dictator 
to collect information and divide the outside opposition, but keeping elites within the party in 
line then becomes more difficult. This finding is important in accounting for the causes and 
consequences of institutional design under dictatorships.
“Political Reform from Above” under a Non-
Democratic Regime:Party/Electoral System 
Reforms and Their Consequences in Mexico, 1960-
1980
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Atsushi Ogushi
This article discusses the reasons why the task of building a dominant party is successful in 
some countries but unsuccessful in others by analyzing the cases of Russia and the Ukraine. 
Although the Kremlin was able to establish a dominant party (United Russia), the Ukrainian 
central government has so far been unable to do so. The article argues that the key to 
understanding this difference is the two countries' different policies with regard to gubernatorial 
appointments. In Russia, where regional governors are influential actors within a federal system, 
the Kremlin succeeded in creating a dominant party by co-opting these governors under a single 
organization. Elections in Russia under this system serve the Kremlin as ‘tests’ of governors’ 
mobilizing power and loyalty. By contrast, the unitary structure of the Ukraine state made it 
easy for presidents to appoint people loyal to them to key positions in the various regions, and 
this threatened the power of the regions, whose elites organized themselves against the centre, 
which has led finally to rampant clan politics. This argument suggests that the formation of a 
dominant party in an authoritarian state with competitive elections and a type of presidentialism 
that is based on patron-client networks, as in Russia and Ukraine, depends on a subtle balance 
between the centre and the regions, which means that central authorities will be unable to 
sustain a dominant party if they seriously interfere with regional interests.
The Limitations on Building a Dominant 
P a r t y :  R u s s i a  a n d  U k r a i n e  f r o m  a 
Comparative Perspective
Abstract
